Chapter - 7
Summary and
Recommendations
7.1 Unparalleled changes have
taken place in broadcasting throughout the world. The boundaries between broadcasting,
telecommunications and information technologies are becoming blurred. We have
also witnessed rapid and fundamental changes in India's media scenario in recent
years, driven by technological developments, economic reforms and liberalisation
and, the demands of increasingly discerning audiences. We have already entered
the era of choice and competition. The conventional and rigid regulations of
yesteryears in the realm of broadcasting have become ineffective and impractical.
The new technologies have demolished the monopoly of State run electronic media
and rendered redundant the regulations. Loosening of controls is a global phenomenon.
On the other band, the satellite revolution launched by the global giants, not
to speak of some enterprising Indian entrepreneurs, is not an unmixed blessing.
The unfettered freedom enjoyed by the foreign satellite channels and their lack
of sensitivity to Indian culture and ethos as also the ersatz culture promoted
by other private channels are matters of continuing concern to people.
7.2 Both Akashvani and Doordarshan have attempted with mixed
success to adjust themselves with the fast changing scenario. They have had
a remarkable record in public service broadcasting. They are the major cultural
patrons of music, drama and the visual arts. They have no peers as purveyors
of messages intended to support and stimulate socioeconomic development. But
what tended to undermine the image of these so called official media was the
impression that had gained ground over the years that they could be influenced
by those who wished to manipulate them for their own needs, whether it is the
government of the day or other interested groups. The vociferous demand for
granting autonomy to the electronic media and thus insulating them against external
pressures ultimately led to the promulgation of the Prasar Bharati Act of 1990.
The postulates that guided the Act have been overtaken by several events of
the nineties especially the emergence of transnational broadcasting and the
two separate but conquering landmark judgements on airwaves by the Supreme Court
in February, 1995 holding inter alia that airwaves of frequencies were a public
property and that broadcasting media should be under the control of the public
as distinct from the Government.
7.3 We noticed an overwhelming consensus in favour of freeing
airwaves from Government monopoly, thereby allowing Indian broadcasters the
facility of uplinking from Indian soil. Such a consensus is absent in regard
to foreign satellite channels, although there is a body of opinion in favor
of this. We also noted that mere denial of permission to a foreign channel does
not prevent it from broadcasting programmes directly to Indian homes with the
help of uplinking facilities from other countries.
7.4 As a sequel to the landmark judgement of the Supreme Court
declaring the airwaves as a public property, there is urgent need fishing a
suitable regulatory framework for the multiplicity of channels likely to emerge
on the audiovisual landscape in the near future. An authority to grant frequencies
and franchises and regulate the licensees, has to he created to ensure that
there is no unfair or unjust treatment and unwarranted infringement of privacy
or violation of accepted standards of public taste and decency. We strongly
endorse the recommendation of the Paswan Sub-Committee for setting up an independent
apex body to regulate and monitor airwaves. We propose setting up a Radio and
Television Authority of India, an independent body which is not part of Prasar
Bharati. On the contrary, Prasar Bharati being one of the many players in the
Indian broadcasting arena, will also be overseen by the Authority as far as
the complaints function' is concerned. The Authority will perform the following
functions:-
i) Licensing of
(a) satellite uplinking
(b) terrestrial analog transmission of radio and television
(c) terrestrial digital transmission of radio and television
(d) multiplex providers
ii) Prescribing programming obligations and programming standards
to ensure quality and diversity.
iii) Making arrangement for ascertaining and monitoring public
opinion about the programmes and services and ascertaining the needs, interests
and tastes of members of the public.
iv) Determine the maximum limit for the quantum of advertising
content so that advertisements are not obtrusive or jarring.
v) Receive complaints of violation of norms of decency and
of the Programming and Advertising Codes and, adjudicate on them after bearing
the parties concerned.
7.5 There is a school of thought which believes that terrestrial
broadcasting should remain the monopoly of Doordarshan. as the National Broadcaster.
We do not agree with this view. We have noticed that local TV stations have
been competing very successfully with satellite channels in other countries.
Why then should not such local terrestrial TV and radio stations be permitted
in a country of India's vast size and diversity? The immediate fallout of allowing
uplinking in respect of private broadcasters, both Indian and foreign and in
permitting local terrestrial stations will be to create enormous job opportunities
and also to bring handsome revenue to the nation.
7.6 We understand that Indian Broadcasters like JAIN, Sun TV
and Asianet and others like Zee TV, Sony, ATN and BITV have been spending crores
of rupees worth of foreign exchange in obtaining uplinking from places like
Dubna in Russia, Subic Bay in the Philippines, Singapore and even Sri Lanka.
This involves diversion of foreign exchange both by the satellite operators
and by Indian companies who have to pay for advertising their products in their
channels in foreign exchange. If and when they are allowed to uplink from Indian
soil their expense will come down considerably and they will also avoid possible
FERA violations. On the other hand, India may gain billions of dollars in foreign
exchange through the licence fee and royalty payable by the foreign satellite
channels and the advertising revenue that will come from companies outside India.
Also this will bring about some real competition for Doordarshan. In the long
run this will improve the competitive strength of Doordarshan and will also
open up opportunities for news and current affairs programmes on foreign networks.
Advertising tariff will substantially escalate as it will be guided by considerations
like event marketing and popularity.
7.7 Another advantage of extending uplinking facilities to
domestic and foreign satellite channels will be that they can be brought under
the purview of Indian laws. While granting licenses the Radio and Television
Authority of India that has been envisaged will compel them to adhere to the
prevalent Programming and Advertising Codes. The Authority will have the power
to prevent telecasting of obscene 'adult' movies and enforce on the satellite
channels the same guidelines that DD follows. Similarly liquor advertisements
can also be done away with. Fears have been expressed by some sections about
the airing of anti-national programmes or messages on private networks and possible
violation of the standards of national security. But we feel such fears are
not justified. It is much better to permit and control airwaves than letting
them move around as a free floating channels. The 1885 Telegraph Act aimed at
checking misuse of airwaves has become outdated and requires to be recast. Before
providing uplinking from Indian soil to a foreign party, the credentials of
the party will have to be scrutinised
7.8 We share the concern of the women's groups and activists
about stereotyping of women and inequality in women's access to and participation
in all communication systems specially in media which has been identified, and
rightly so, as one of the critical areas for the advancement and empowerment
of women. This is an area to which the proposed Radio and Television Authority
as well as Prasar Bharati should give due weightage.
7.9 This Group believes that Prasar Bharati, as the inheritor
of the great tradition, should be the quintessential public service broadcaster.
This is not to suggest that private broadcasters have no role to play in this
sphere. Indeed, the private operators should have an obligation to put out programmes
devoted to socially relevant themes and earmark certain slots for the purpose.
7.10 This Group recognises that for public broadcasting financial
support from the Government is inevitable. We do not subscribe to the view that
this might lead to an abridgement of the autonomy of Prasar Bharati, in any
way, we are suggesting the revival of the Broadcast Receiver Licence (BRL) fee
for TV sets. Such public funding will place on Prasar Bharati an obligation
to be accountable to its clientele.
7.11 So far there has been very inadequate attention given
to marketing in Akashvani and Doordarshan systems. First, our electronic media
have to compete with invaders of the scene from the outside and the domestic
competitors. Secondly, they will have to compete a great deal with each other.
We have no doubt that this process will bring about a new motivation and all
round innovativeness in both these organisations in creating as well as marketing
new products and services. We notice that in recent months Akashvani has registered
a significant improvement in its marketing activities resulting in earning of
extra revenue whereas Doordarshan has lagged behind in its marketing efforts
in the last one or two years. Not only has it given up direct marketing, it
appears to have gone for the softer option of franchising to others which accounts
for the significant fall in its ad revenue compared to earlier years. We recommend
that both the organisations should give a lot of importance to marketing. There
should be one Deputy Managing Director each in Akashvani and Doordarshan for
marketing. We also note that the Ministry has constituted a Committee to evolve
suitable strategies for marketing airtime in Akashvani and Doordarshan. The
strategies and recommendations made by this Committee will be of considerable
use for Prasar Bharati in revamping their marketing.
7.12 We are presenting hereunder summary of the major recommendations
of this Group.
1. Prasar Bharati should be a Statutory Corporation as envisaged
in the Act and can start operating immediately. The preamble to the Act may
be suitably amplified and the suggested modified version is reproduced hereunder:-
"An Act is to be provided for the establishment of a Broadcasting Corporation
of India, to be known as Prasar Bharati for providing public service broadcasting
and fulfil the basic information, education and entertainment needs of the people
and to define its composition, functions and powers and to provide for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto."
2. It is necessary to split Akashvani and Doordarshan into
two completely separate wings under the corporate umbrella of the Prasar Bharati
Corporation, with close coordination in areas clearly defined and delineated
by the Corporation. For all practical purposes they should operate as separate
entities. Steps should be taken to demarcate the hardware and the assets between
Akashvani and Doordarshan and, bifurcate the personnel across all disciplines.
(3.2)
3. We recommend a full-time Chairman, instead of the part-time
Chairman as envisaged in the Act, in the interest of autonomy and in view of
the 'magnitude of the network of the two wings and expansion of their operations
in the years to come. We also feel that the functions of the Chairman and of
Chief Executive should be combined in one functionary, i.e. the whole-time Chairman.
(3.6)
4. We recommend six full-time and four part-time members of
the Board, in addition to a representative from the Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting not below the level of a Joint Secretary. The Managing Directors
of Akashvani and Doordarshan will be Members of the Prasar Bharati Board representing
radio and television respectively. (3.7)
5. We are of the firm opinion that the provision for two elected
representatives, of the employees of the Corporation on the Board is fraught
with serious complications. The acrimony and disharmony likely to be generated
by this process, owing to the plethora of associations representing conflicting
interests might jeopardise the smooth functioning of the Board. However, we
recommend introduction of a separate scheme of employees' participation in management,
both in Akashvani and Doordarshan, below the Board level to look after the various
issues related to staff and their welfare. In addition to this, a trade union
leader of standing not necessarily serving in Akashvani or Doordarshan could
be nominated to the Prasar Bharati Board as a part-time member. (3.8) &
(3.9)
6. We recommend that the Chairman of the Prasar Bharati Board
shall be appointed by the President of India on the recommendation of a Committee
consisting of
a) the Chairman of the Council of States, who shall be the
Chairman of the Committee
b) the Leader of the Opposition, in the Lok Sabha; and
c) the Chairman of the Press Council. (3.10)
Composition of the Committee for selection of other full-time Members
of the Board may be as under:-
a) the Chairman of the Press Council who will be the Chairman
of the Committee
b) the Chairman of the Prasar Bharati
c) the Chairman, Union Public Service Commission; and
d) the Chairman, Public Enterprises Selection Board. (3.11)
7. We recommend that the
term of office of the Chairman as well as of each whole-time member should be
five years from the date on which they enter office or until he or she attains
the age of 58 years, whichever is earlier. However, the first Chairman may be
allowed to complete the full term of five years irrespective of his or her age.
And, for part-time members the term of office should be of two years rather
than six years as contemplated in the Act. (3.13)
8. We recommend that the officers and other employees recruited
specifically for Akashvani and Doordarshan, whether they belong to organised
service or not, should not have the option against becoming an employee of the
Corporation. As regards those borne on cadres such as the Indian Information
Service and Central Secretariat Service, they may continue on deputation, if
they are not prepared to be inducted into the Corporation, at the discretion
of the Corporation. (3.22) & (3.23)
9. The Group recommends that the Section 13(1) of the Act under
which a Parliamentary Committee is required to be constituted to 'oversee' the
Corporation, may dispensed with. In our opinion, the Standing Committee on Communication,
looking after the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and also the Consultative
Committee attached to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, can perform
the roles assigned to the said Parliamentary Committee. (3.25)
10. We recommend the setting up of an independent Radio and
Television Authority of India, as strongly enjoined by the Supreme Court, to
license private channels, domestic and foreign, to impose appropriate terms
and conditions on these licensees in accordance with the Broadcasting and Advertising
Codes and also to receive and adjudicate on complaints of violation of these
Codes, received from the public or representative bodies or consumers' forums.
These 'complaints' functions of the Authority will also cover the channels run
by Prasar Bharati. This Authority will also serve as the regulatory mechanism
for private radio and television stations/ channels. As such, the establishment
of a Broadcasting Council under Section 14 is not considered necessary. (3.26)
11. We find the provision under Section 24 of the Act enabling
the Central Government to seek such information as the Government may consider
necessary, rather sweeping and nebulous and may impair the very concept of autonomous
functioning of Prasar Bharati. There is need to precisely define the areas in
respect of which the Corporation will furnish information to the Central Government.
Of course, the Central Government can legitimately ask the Corporation to furnish
all forecasts, estimates, information and documents which the Government may
require with regard to the financial transactions and engagements of the Corporation.
(3.27)
12. We recommend six Deputy Managing Directors under the Managing
Director of Akashvani and Doordarshan respectively representing the six disciplines
of engineering, programmes, news, marketing and audience research, finance,
and personnel/ administration. (3.30)
13. There is urgent need to create a professional marketing
set-up in the Corporation, one each for both the wings, i.e. Akashvani and Doordarshan.
As a first step in this direction, the Commercial Broadcasting Wing of these
two organisations should be strengthened and the personnel trained in the art
of marketing airtime. (3.30)
14. We recommend an authorised share capital of say Rs. 5,000
crores and paid-up capital of Rs. 2,000 crores for the Prasar Bharati. (4.4)
15. The hardware at the disposal of Akashvani and Doordarshan
of the estimated value of Rs. 55,000 crores can be transferred on a 99-year
lease to Prasar Bharati. (4.4)
16. While self-sufficiency should be the ultimate goal of Prasar
Bharati, it will have to initially depend on an annual grant-in-aid from the
Government. As and when the share of advertising and commercial revenue goes
up, grant-in-aid will gradually diminish. (4.5)
17. We recommend the revival of an annual BR Licence fee for
TV sets - Rs. 500 on a colour TV and Rs. 200 on black & White sets. The
fee could he collected through commercial banks. Alternatively, if a one-time
BRL fee to be levied at the time of purchase of TV set is found acceptable,
we recommend a fee of Rs. 1000 for colour TV and Rs. 500 for black & white.
(4.7)
18. The Prasar Bharati should evolve more aggressive strategies
for the sale of programme material including archival material, facilities,
services and expertise available in abundance in Akashvani and Doordarshan to
meet the heavy capital investment required in the next decade to take advantage
of technological opportunities. (4.9)
19. We are convinced that without statutory protection, public
service broadcasting will be far too vulnerable, especially in a multi-channel
scenario. Public service broadcasting needs to be structurally embedded to Prasar
Bharati so that it becomes a source of enrichment and empowerment of the masses.
(5.3)
20. The cost of running the public service broadcasting channels,
as distinct from purely entertainment-oriented channels, should be met from
the Central Government's funding paid to the Corporation by way of grant-in-aid,
equity or loan. As far as the external services and the Central Monitoring Service
are concerned, the Central Government would reimburse expenses incurred by the
Corporation in this regard as mentioned in Section 12(4). (5.4)
21. Doordarshan and Akashvani should dedicate at least one
channel to education, including both literacy promotion and continuing education.
Satellite channels including the Open Universities and institutions of higher
learning should also be encouraged to do so. The spread of literacy among the
people will make them capable of forging their own destinies. (5.4) & (5.5)
22. We recommend that the Government should consider granting
licences to satellite channel operators, domestic or foreign, with uplinking
facilities from the Indian soil. The major spinoff of such a policy will be
generation of substantial revenue. and also employment opportunities and regulatory
control to ensure that the private operators also fall in line with Prasar Bharati
in terms of adherence to the programming and advertising codes in vogue in this
country. (6.1)
23. We recommend that local terrestrial TV and radio stations
should be permitted. These stations will also help municipal bodies and Panchayati
Raj Institutions in providing local broadcasting services to the community.
For this purpose, the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 could be suitably amended.
(6.4)
24. We have elsewhere recommended (Recommendation No. 10) creation
of an independent Radio and Television Authority of India to grant licences
subject to payment of requisite fee and adherence to the standard codes of broadcasting
and advertising of our country. All complaints relating to infringement of these
codes should be brought before the Authority to initiate punitive action where
considered necessary. The decision of the Authority shall be binding. The Authority
will take a firm and objective stance in support of healthy development and
growth of radio and television network in India while containing and controlling
mushroom growth. (6.6)
25. The proposed Radio and Television Authority to be created
by a new Act should consist of a full-time President with a sound background
of the electronic media and ten members appointed by the President of India
from amongst the public-academia, consumer activists, social scientists/researchers,
etc. This Authority, inter alia will perform the 'complaints' function as envisaged
for the Broadcasting Council in Section 15 of the Act which will not be necessary
any longer. (6.10)
N.K.SENGUPTA
(Chairman)
M.R.NARAYANA
(Member)
VED LEKHA
(Member)
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6